

History



Commentary to support marking

Subject: HISTORY

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Essay: 31A

| Criterion | Mark | Out of | Justification |
|---------------|------|--------|---|
| A | 5 | 6 | The R/Q is clear and Title and word count provided. Source base is appropriate. Context is established and an attempt to explain methodology. More detail could have been provided about revisionist/post-revisionist historians and 'key witnesses' to be considered. 'Other factors' are mentioned but deserve development. Referencing of material could be improved. Essay remains focused on the task. |
| B | 6 | 6 | Knowledge and Understanding is very good though a need, at times, for clarification/evidential support. Band 5-6. Best fit 6. |
| C | 11 | 12 | A well-structured essay with a good grasp of historiographical issues. Coherent, well articulated line of argument. Evidence of research and effective analysis and a conclusion reflective of the evidence presented |
| D | 4 | 4 | Some referencing issues and some details of provenance omitted in the Bibliography but these issues are for Academic Honesty to consider (the essay was raised as an exception for these reasons and marks should not be deducted for these issues according to IBO) Presentation generally merits a 4: visually attractive and neatly organised in terms of provision of Title, RQ, Word Count, Bibliography (alphabetically arranged), accurate pagination and the provision of a Table of Contents, formal introduction and conclusion |
| E | 5 | 6 | There is reflection and evidence of initiative, conceptual understanding and awareness of challenges and how they were met (could have been developed however in more detail). Engagement with the topic and the RQ is apparent. Borderline 4/5, best fit 5. |
| Total: | 31 | 34 | |

Candidate Marks Report

Series : M18 2018

This candidate's script has been assessed using On-Screen Marking. The marks are therefore not shown on the script itself, but are summarised in the table below.

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EXTENDED
ESSAY in
ENGLISH
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In the table below 'Total Mark' records the mark scored by this candidate.
'Max Mark' records the Maximum Mark available for the question.

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|---------------------|----------------------------------|
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| Paper Total: | 31 / 34 |
| Question | Total / Max Mark Mark |
| Criterion A | 5 / 6 |
| Criterion B | 6 / 6 |
| Criterion C | 11 / 12 |
| Criterion D | 4 / 4 |
| Criterion E | 5 / 6 |

Coursework confirmation

Yes

Hours supervisor spent with candidate

4

Declaration

Yes

International Baccalaureate

Extended Essay

History

**The influence of the United Fruit Company
and communism on the Guatemalan Coup
D'état**

*To what extent did the United Fruit Company contribute to
the implementation of the Guatemalan coup d'état in 1954?*

RQ, Title and word count
provided

Word Count: 3853

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ToC provided

1.0 Introduction

The Guatemalan coup d'état was a covert operation carried out by a rebel group backed by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) that occurred from the 18th to the 27th of June 1954, codenamed Operation PBSUCCESS. Led by Colonel Carlos Castillos Armas, the operation overthrew the democratically elected Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz and installed the dictatorship of Carlos Armas. This brought the Guatemalan Revolution of 1944 to 1954, known as the "Ten Years of Spring" to an end. The coup lead to a series of military dictatorships following Armas' demise, as well as the Guatemalan Civil War from 1960 to 1996, which included state-sanctioned violence and widespread human rights violations.

From 1931 to 1944, Guatemala was under the rule of dictator Jorge Ubico, who granted significant concessions to the United Fruit Company and wealthy landowners. In 1944, university students and labour organisations formed the Guatemalan Revolution, forcing the government's resignation and electing Jose Arevalo as president. Arevalo enacted moderate social reform, culminating in the 1947 Labor Code (Glejjeses 41). Arbenz' presidency continued the progressive reforms which lead to Decree 900, an extensive agrarian reform program that redistributed land to peasants and agricultural workers by expropriating unused land from wealthy landowners and the United Fruit Company. The United Fruit Company (UFCO) was an American corporation involved in the production of bananas grown on Central and South American plantations. It was the largest landowner, exporter, and employer in Guatemala (Schlesinger and Kinzer 70). In addition, the company

limited referencing provided

invested in many important enterprises of Guatemala, and UFCO had influence in terms of wealth and connections to U.S. officials.

details?

The essay aims to explore perspectives with regards to UFCO's role in the Guatemalan coup, as well as how the UFCO compares to other factors in terms of influencing the coup. This leads to the research question **"To what extent did the United Fruit Company contribute to the implementation of the Guatemalan coup d'état in 1954?"** In the question, it is assumed that the UFCO directly contributed to the coup. However, another factor U.S. fears of communist influence in Guatemalan government also played a role in determining the implementation of the coup. The views of revisionist and post-revisionist historians will be consulted.

such as?

any names/historians?

The research question is worthy of investigation because of the different views and narratives that this topic encapsulates. Due to the release of new information and sources from governmental agencies and key witnesses leading to conflicting historiography, previous revisionist narratives that have been published as influential, mainstream works have been cast into doubt. Books and journals published by new authors convey a more nuanced and complex perspective (Streeter 62), displacing the convenient narrative of U.S. economic imperialism being the overarching cause of the Guatemalan coup d'état. An investigation of this research question will more clearly define the causes of the coup, and the size of the role played by UFCO, as well as assess responsibility for the coup.

eg?

eg?

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In this investigation, information and historical perspectives are taken from sources before, during, and after the coup. This includes books, news articles, websites, U.S.

government documents and primary documents. Primary sources such as government documents and memos leading up to the coup were used. Books and essays by historians were used to examine historical analysis. The variety of sources will better facilitate a informed analysis of the factors and influences of the Guatemalan coup d'état.

Clear task, context established and attempt to explain methodology

2.0 Evaluation of the factors that caused the coup

2.1 The influence of the United Fruit Company

In 1944, U.S. investment in Guatemala totaled about 93 million (Glejises 86) and was centralised in three companies: The Empresa Electrica de Guatemala, the International Railways of Central America (IRCA), and the United Fruit Company. Guatemala's previous dictator Jorge Ubico was generous with his support of UFCO, allowing it "total exemption from internal taxation, duty-free importation of all necessary goods and a guarantee of low wages" (Schlesinger and Kinzer 70). United Fruit contributed investment into the country, buying shares of the International Railway of Central America, the only railroad in Guatemala, and administered Guatemala's only Atlantic port, Puerto Barrios. Due to its numerous stakes in every important enterprise, it was given the sobriquet *El Pulpo*, the octopus (Cullather 10).

After Arbenz came to power, he initiated a strategy of limiting the power of foreign companies through direct competition rather than nationalisation. One of the main tenets of his agrarian reform was the expropriation of unused land, which proved unpopular with large landowners such as United Fruit. The company considered the compensation for the expropriated land insufficient. The introduction of the Labour Code by Arevalo and enforced by Arbenz also irritated United Fruit. In 1947, the previous president had passed the Labour

Code, which gave workers the right to organise. This law affected many large *fincas* (agricultural estates) and state farms, but United Fruit argued that the law discriminated against the company. The United States Embassy agreed. The First Secretary of the Embassy Andrew Wardlaw explained, “If the Guatemalans want to handle a Guatemalan company roughly that is none of our business, but if they handle an American company roughly it is our business” (Cullather 16). United Fruit had never asked for official support from the United States before, but now looked to recruit the Embassy and the State Department to intervene on the negotiations.

2.1.1 Governmental lobbying and ties

The United Fruit Company and its associates had legal, financial, and political ties to United States officials, and used them to bring attention to their charges of communism, pressure the Guatemalan government in relenting on agrarian and labour policies, as well as suppress criticism from the State Department. In early 1949, Henry Cabot Lodge brought up the topic of communism to Congress. His family owned stock in the UFCO, and he later became the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. The U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala James Peurifoy, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and his brother and director of the Central Intelligence Agency Allen Dulles, were the most prominent amongst those who were entwined with UFCO businessmen, lobbyists, and lawyers. Ambassador Peurifoy had acted as United Fruit’s representative in negotiations with Guatemala (Schlesinger and Kinzer 24). After UFCO lobbying, congress members criticised a labour dispute, resulting in later UFCO dismissals of workers’ complaints as solely political disagreements (Schlesinger and Kinzer 72). According to Lehman, the relationship between the Secretary of State and his brother Allen Dulles “undoubtedly facilitated communication, teamwork and secrecy” (202). The

Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs John Moors Cabot and his brother Thomas Cabot was the President of the UFCO from 1948.

During the agrarian reform, vast amounts of uncultivated land owned by United Fruit were expropriated by Arbenz' government, with the compensation of USD \$1,185,000 in bonds (Immerman 81). This number was based on UFCO's declared valuation for tax purposes. However, United Fruit had historically undervalued its land in order to reduce its already miniscule tax liability. A formal complaint was delivered to the Guatemalan government by the U.S. State Department on behalf of the United Fruit Company, stating that the Guatemalan offer "bears not the slightest resemblance to just evaluation." (Immerman 81). According to historian Cole Blasier, the document "read more like a legal brief for the United Fruit Company" than diplomatic communication (208). In April 1954, the United States sent a bill on behalf of the UFCO for \$15,854,849 from Guatemala in compensation for the Tiquiate land (Immerman 81).

explain

The government officials that acted on behalf of UFCO interests also suppressed critical evaluation of U.S. policies towards Guatemala within the State Department. In April 1950, the labour officer of the State Department John Fishburn argued in a memorandum that the department's support of UFCO was erroneous, and would seem "most unwise for [the State Department] to be tied to the company's position without regard for Guatemala's aspirations or sovereign feelings" (Fishburn). The embassy in Guatemala sent him a cutting refutation, and Edward W. Clark of the Office of Middle American Affairs (MID) addressed to the U.S. chargé in Guatemala, "All of us here in MID think Fishburn is way off the beam in his thinking on this matter..." (Clark), thus supporting Lehman's argument that the United

OK

Fruit Company had successfully aligned American affairs with the affairs of the UFCO, resulting in the dismissal of valid criticism.

2.1.2 Propaganda program

Besides employing connections to government officials, the United Fruit Company also conducted a public-relations and media propaganda campaign in the United States to bolster their image. United Fruit employed Edward L. Bernays, the “father of modern public relations” to be a public relations consultant (Cullather 16). The company’s public relations director Edmund Whitman often said, “Whenever you read ‘United Fruit’ in Communist propaganda,” he said, “you may readily substitute ‘United States.’” (Cortell and Peterson 103). Another figure was Thomas G. Corcoran, a prominent Washington lawyer. Described as a “purveyor of concentrated influence” and acted as UFCO’s link to people of power (Cullather 16).

Bernays organised a series of press junkets to Guatemala, which increased in frequency. Between 1952 and 1954, Bernays put together at least five “fact-finding” trips. REF According to Thomas McCann, a former UFCO official, the trips were “carefully timed and regulated with no expense spared” and that they were “a serious attempt to compromise objectivity” (45). Time, Newsweek, Scripps-Howard, United Press International, the Christian Science Monitor, the Miami Herald, and the San Francisco Chronicle contributed editors and reporters, which described the UFCO as a “uplifting local living standards while being unfairly attacked by Communists who were trying to destroy its good works” (Schlesinger and Kinzer 87).

By early 1954, Bernay's meticulously planned campaign succeeded, engineering an atmosphere of American suspicion regarding the nature and intentions of the Guatemalan government. Schlesinger and Kinzer conclude that without United Fruit's difficulties in Guatemala, it is unlikely that the United States would have paid attention to communist activities in Guatemala. The authors justify this by noting that larger numbers of communists had engaged in political activity on a greater scale in other Central and South American countries without creating excessive concern in the United States (Schlesinger and Kinzer 106).

such as for example?

2.1.3 Evidence against UFCO influence

However, evidence against the United Fruit Company's interests being the United States' main motivation for the Guatemalan coup d'état has emerged in recent publications, seen in the views of key participants and observers of the coup, as well as the U.S. government's actions and inaction, which support other reasons for the overthrow. Jose Manuel Fortuny, the former leader of the *Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo* (PTG), Guatemala's Communist party has said, "They would have overthrown us even if we had grown no bananas." (Glejises 4). U.S. Diplomat Adolf A. Berle told Costa Rican leader Jose Figueres, "[...] we expected American rights to be protected, including the [UFCO]; but the United Fruit Company's interests were secondary to the main interests." (Berle 616).

The Eisenhower administration considered United Fruit's disputes with the Guatemalan authorities as a "subsidiary" problem, and was more focused on the issue of communism in Guatemala (Streeter 67). Though UFCO had influenced Washington in the 1940s, this was due to a lack of knowledge by U.S. diplomats about Guatemala. "As the

embassy became more sophisticated in its understanding of Guatemala, however, the company's influence dwindled" (Streeter 67). It was not the United Fruit Company but the C.I.A. who persuaded the State Department to focus its attention on Guatemala. When the C.I.A. was evaluating potential leaders for "The Liberation", the U.S. funded anti-communist group tasked to overthrow Arbenz, they removed Cordova Cerna from the list due to his position as United Fruit's legal counsel, as his leadership would have been tainted by charges of banana imperialism (Streeter 69).

any evidence of this?

Another point against the influence of the UFCO was the pending lawsuit against it. United Fruit's monopolies in Central America led to an investigation by the U.S. Justice Department. In 1951, the department was preparing for court action until the State Department intervened. "In a National Security Council session, Department representatives argued that a legal attack on United Fruit's Guatemalan holdings would have 'serious foreign policy implications,' weakening the company at a time when the United States needed it" (Cullather 19). Cullather suggests that this incident points to the opposite of the revisionist view: instead of the United States acting on UFCO's behalf, the U.S. government wanted to use United Fruit as a tool to limit communism (19).

REF

OK

The view of the United Fruit Company being the main motivation of the implementation of the 1954 coup is seen as the revisionist stance in historiography. Streeter asserts that the popularity of this stance peaked in the early 1980s, culminating in the book *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* by journalists Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer. Although most of their conclusions are correct, Schlesinger and Kinzer are criticised for maintaining their original position that Arbenz's ideology had

nothing to do with the coup, even in light of new evidence. Paul Dosal notes that the revised edition of *Bitter Fruit* continually supports that Arbenz's ideology as nationalism, and that communist accusations were "farfetched" (34). Historians Ralph Woodward and Stephen Streeter both accuse *Bitter Fruit* of omissions and reliance on circumstantial evidence in order to downplay communist influence in the Arbenz government, leading to a misleading depiction of events.

2.2 Other reasons for the coup d'état

2.2.1 C.I.A. fear of communism

However, there are other causes of the coup. The implementation of the Guatemalan coup d'état was also due to a multitude of actions in Guatemala that due to the perceptions of the United States led American officials to attribute these actions to communism. According to Lehman, historians commonly concur that the dangers of communism were exaggerated, and that it was not a threat to Guatemala (90). Historian Cole Blasier expresses that there were misinterpretations of actions on the sides of both countries. Lehman views the U.S. as having overreacted and attributed national reforms, attacks on private capital, and expressions of anti-americanism to communist influence. According to Gleijeses, U.S. hostility towards Guatemala was encouraged more by "cold war paranoia and sheer ignorance" than by UFCO machinations (197). Lehman explains that "issues of communism, anti-americanism, and attacks on U.S. private interests were rapidly coalescing", which resulted in the implementation of the U.S. coup in Guatemala (201).

During his tenure as president, it was clear that Arbenz sympathised with communism, and surrounded himself with the leaders of the Guatemalan communist party, the PGT (*Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo*). According to interviews with his wife and his then-close friends by historian Piero Gleijeses, the PGT leaders were his “kitchen cabinet” and most immediate advisers (182). They discussed important decisions including the agrarian reform and the arms purchase from Czechoslovakia. He became highly influenced by their ideas, which led to the Communist party having more influence than was proportional to their electoral representation. Arbenz believed that the triumph of communism in Guatemala and around the world was both inevitable and desirable. Though Arbenz did not appoint communists to his official cabinet and appointed few communists to significant posts, these positions were highly visible to United States officials, such as the control of national broadcasting, the agrarian department and the social security administration.

which was?

Arbenz’s friendship with communist leaders pushed him closer to communism and led to his most famous reform, Decree 900. The United States feared that Arbenz’s agrarian reform would lead to the penetration and spread of communism in the countryside. The widespread change would be an opportunity for the communists to mobilise previously dormant peasants, destroy the political effectiveness of landholders, and spread disorder in the countryside. The U.S. State Department knew that Decree 900 had originated in the PGT, and had “strong political motivation and significance” (Cullather 23). Another fear was that Guatemala’s peasant revolution would spread by example. The reform was a powerful propaganda weapon, as it had a broad social program of aiding workers and peasants in the struggle against upper classes and large foreign businesses. This message appealed strongly

to the peoples of Central America under similar conditions. Conservative Guatemalan

SEEN Journalist Marroquin Rojas wrote, “It was impossible to escape the contagion.” (Glejeses 333).

For many Guatemalans, there was genuine resentment for the United Fruit Company, and the fact that it represented the United States’ economic interests. Alfonso Paiz, the Minister of Labor and Economy under Arbenz, said, “All the achievements of the Company were made at the expense of the impoverishment of the country [...] The United Fruit Company is the principal enemy [...] of Guatemala, of its democracy and of every effort directed at its economic liberation.” (Schlesinger and Kinzer 73). The UFCO represented

SEEN Guatemala’s reliance on foreign markets and capital, and held a stranglehold over Guatemala’s economy. Anti-UFCO newspapers were “a fundamental component of Guatemalan nationalism with broad cross-class appeal” (Lehman 197). Both Lehman and Glejeses agree that it was a smooth shift from anti-americanism to pro-Soviet support that **SEEN** stemmed from frustrated nationalism and hubristic sense of impunity, fanned by the arrogance and intransigence of the United States. To Guatemalans, Eisenhower’s policies were an “infuriating substantiation of the dual implications of the backyard analogy - the tendency of the United States to impose its will at moments of crisis and then to ignore the region when all seemed calm.” (Lehman 211).

U.S. suspicion increased as the Guatemalan media and revolutionary politicians **RE** criticized the involvement of the United States in the Korean War and ran articles from Czech newspapers. While most articles from the state newspaper *Diario de Centro America (DCA)* were neutralist, there was a preference for pro-communist articles. Czechoslovakia was a

Soviet satellite country, and in 1953, fifty-three articles described life in Czechoslovakia sympathetically, while no other countries underwent this treatment (Gleijeses 178). Though the the Korean war was rarely commented upon in the DCA, there was occasional editorial criticism of the role of the United States in the Korean war and praise for the communist Korean people. After the 1953 Korean armistice, numerous politicians celebrated the triumph of world peace over power-hungry western aggressors, and extolled the Koreans in a large rally. U.S. ambassador Schoenfeld noted that it was a “public demonstration of the Arbenz administration’s cooperation with the local communist group...the rally was attended by ranking administration officials, political leaders and army officers subject to his discipline and dependent on his goodwill, it was evident that there was more than official tolerance for it.” (Gleijeses 181).

Other actions by Arbenz and the Guatemalan congress confirmed the fears of the United States, such as the impeachment of Supreme Court judges and the purchase of weapons from Czechoslovakia. In February 1953, the Guatemalan Supreme Court declared Decree 900 unconstitutional and suspended the reform. Arbenz swiftly used the congress to impeach the judges, replacing them with officials who overturned the rulings. The demonstration of executive power “struck many in the United States as definitive proof of the regime’s totalitarian character.” (Gleijeses 155). Since 1951, the U.S. hindered efforts of the Guatemalan government to purchase weapons from other countries. In 1953, Arbenz learned that the United States was plotting his overthrow, and planned to secretly acquire weapons from Czechoslovakia. This was the first time a Soviet bloc country had delivered weapons to the Western Hemisphere. Although most of the Czech weaponry was intended for the Guatemalan military, Arbenz’s closest political associates affirmed that some weapons were

intended to arm workers' militias (Dosal 635). The discovery of the shipment spurred hostile reactions from the United States congress and press, and was denounced by Foster Dulles as an "extension of Soviet Colonialism" (Waggoner), and a Congressman described it as "like an atom bomb planted in the rear of our backyard" (Glejeses 299). Glejeses argued that this incident was used to justify the escalation of U.S. aggression (304).


American officials were disturbed by the increasing influence of communism in Guatemala. However, they knew that the communists were not in control. Neither CIA nor embassy officials nor military attaches ever claimed the the army was infiltrated by communists, and they noted that the army was Guatemala's key institution. However, they worried for the future as although the PGT was small, it was structured, disciplined and coherent. In 1952, the CIA claimed "The communists will attempt to subvert or neutralise the army" (United States), and they feared that under pressure from Arbenz and the PGT, the army might be unable to retain the monopoly of weapons and agree to release weapons to a people's militia. More immediately, Arbenz's Guatemala threatened the stability of Central America. They were the only country in the region that offered sanctuary to persecuted communists, and were inaccurately believed by the U.S. to be actively engaged in subverting their neighbours.

examples?

Cullather concluded that UFO played a minor role, as the C.I.A. recognised Guatemala as a serious threat even before Arbenz expropriated the company's property, and "the threat to American business was a minor part of the larger danger to the United States' overall security" (37). United Fruit was a tool used by the CIA to remove a perceived security threat. Once the company's usefulness expired, the Eisenhower administration proceeded

✓ with its antitrust action, which in 1958 forced the company to divest of its Guatemalan holdings (Cullather 118). Gleijeses holds the view that in the course of the Revolution, the influence of communism in shaping Guatemalans policy increased, while the influence of the United Fruit Company in shaping American policy decreased (7).

The view that the United Fruit Company did not play an especially large role in the Guatemalan coup is seen as post-revisionist. Compared to revisionist perspectives, post-revisionism takes a more nuanced view and considers complex factors, such as the U.S. perception of communism. Richard Immerman's *The C.I.A. in Guatemala*, Nick Cullather's *Secret History* and Piero Gleijeses' *Shattered Hope* all downplay the influence of the United

SEEN Fruit Company and emphasise U.S. security concerns regarding communism in Guatemala. However, Lehman attributes both the perceptions of communism and the manipulations of UFCO to the coup and describes United Fruit as “a lightning rod  drawing the animosity of Guatemalan nationalists and transmitting it, along with attributions of all it might mean, back to the United States” (197). It was the UFCO that ascribed challenges to its monopoly to communists and used its network of U.S. officials and influential people to terminate criticism of concerns.

3.0 Conclusion

After discussion and evaluation of the factors influence the Guatemalan coup d'état, it is surmised that the United Fruit Company contributed to the 1954 Guatemalan coup to some extent. Without the influence of the UFCO, Guatemala's administration would still have **SEEN** enacted agrarian reform and policies that would be interpreted as communist by the U.S.

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However, UFCO manipulations brought these policies to U.S. attention and prevented critical analysis. New evidence and analysis produces a more nuanced view of the United States' fear of communist influence in the highest echelons of the Guatemalan government, seen through the complex lense of perceptions and misperceptions. However, this does not justify U.S. intervention, and proved the Latin American view that the United States preferred unquestioning allies even if they were dictatorial, rather than democratic leaders. Lehman

SEEN

argues that policies in Guatemala stemmed from "simplified attributions and quick-fix crisis management" (213), and Guatemala should have been analysed more cautiously within the structure of Latin American history rather than that of the Cold War (201). As a result of the coup, the agrarian and industrial development of Guatemala was set back, dictatorships were reinstated, and political activists turned to guerilla warfare rather than elections, leading to the tragic, decades-long Guatemalan Civil War.

well structured, grasp of historiography and coherent in its well articulated argumentation
Interesting essay

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EE/RPPF

For first assessment in 2018

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Candidate personal code

Extended essay - Reflections on planning and progress form

Candidate: This form is to be completed by the candidate during the course and completion of their EE. This document records reflections on your planning and progress, and the nature of your discussions with your supervisor. You must undertake three formal reflection sessions with your supervisor: The first formal reflection session should focus on your initial ideas and how you plan to undertake your research; the interim reflection session is once a significant amount of your research has been completed, and the final session will be in the form of a viva voce once you have completed and handed in your EE. This document acts as a record in supporting the authenticity of your work. The three reflections combined must amount to no more than 500 words.

The completion of this form is a mandatory requirement of the EE for first assessment May 2018. It must be submitted together with the completed EE for assessment under Criterion E.

Supervisor: You must have three reflection sessions with each candidate, one early on in the process, an interim meeting and then the final viva voce. Other check-in sessions are permitted but do not need to be recorded on this sheet. After each reflection session candidates must record their reflections and as the supervisor you must sign and date this form.

First reflection session

Candidate comments:

I chose History as my EE subject as I find it fascinating and relevant to present times. I first made a mindmap of history topics I was interested in, such as WWII resistance movements and the aftermath of WWII, the beginnings of the Cold War and its effect on Berlin and the parallels between islamophobia and McCarthyism. I selected the aftermath of WWII to focus on as it would encompass a broad range of topics such as civilian rescue and attacks, extrajudicial revenge, famine and liberations of cities. The fact that the end of war was messy and not clear-cut as one would hope is extremely interesting and also horrifying, as one takes a closer look at the rawness of human nature. My EE supervisor suggested two extensive history books to be bought on Kindle and digitally annotated, which would make further inquiries into the research more convenient as opposed to using a physical book. Other sources could also be found in their bibliographies, the school library, and the Wikipedia citations.

SEEN

Date:

Supervisor initials:

Interim reflection

Candidate comments:

I have narrowed down my research question to "To what extent did the United Fruit Company contribute to the implementation of the Guatemalan coup d'état in 1954?". Originally, I thought that a "to what extent" question was not possible because I assumed from preliminary reading that the United Fruit Company (UFCO) was definitely responsible for the coup, however through further research, I realised that the coup stemmed from a multitude of factors and could not be traced back to one source. I learned that one could not formulate a research question based solely on several books, but had to look at critical reviews of the books themselves and supplement with additional material in order to understand a historical situation and its historiography fully. I now have a clear research question and a proper range of historical sources, which will ease my writing process.

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Date: May 23rd 2017

Supervisor initials:

Final reflection - Viva voce

Candidate comments:

Now that my essay is complete, I have gained a developed understanding of Guatemala's situation from 1944 to 1954, and the economic, political and social relationship between Latin-America and the United States, and how these factors influenced the cause of the coup. Were I to undertake this topic again, I would have started with a wider range of sources, and instead of focusing only on books, use reviews of those books and journals from databases such as JSTOR. I borrowed electronic books as opposed to physical, because bookmarking and finding key words became much easier. Skills I developed would be refining essay structure and writing. I realised that when writing a long essay, more time should be devoted to creating a solid structure to prevent paragraphs of redundancy. Another skill would be conciseness and selecting information to include and delete. Although I was intimidated by the long word count, I realise now that 4000 words is easy to fulfill. In conclusion, the skills I gained through writing the Extended Essay will definitely contribute to further essay writing.

on balance- best fit 5

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Date: December 6th 2017

Supervisor initials:

Supervisor comments:

Her first conclusion about the whole process was “not as straight forward as she thought it might have been”. This student discovered that a lot of reading was needed in order to narrow down her research question. For her research she mainly used e-books. She found it easy to keep track of her research. Her main challenge was to keep tracking down the information found and make sure she was not plagiarizing. This student improved her essay writing skills throughout the whole process. She realized that working out the layout was a major part of the exercise, and with a good layout, the chances of writing a good essay improves. One of the main skills learnt throughout was time management. The idea of writing a 4,000 words piece was scary at first for this student, but with a good planning, this activity seems less daunting at the end, she confessed.

From a quite narrative first draft to a more argumentative final essay, she has used all the feedback given to improve her work throughout. I enjoyed working with this student and was pleased to read her final product.

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